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Abstract 
This commentary examines the decision in R (HC) v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department that the exclusion of 17 year olds from the special protections conferred on all 
other children whilst in police detention was unlawful. It sets out the protections afforded to 
children whilst detained by the police, and considers in particular the Court’s focus on the 
parent-child relationship and thus the use of Article 8 to give effect to the child’s youth 
justice rights. 
 
Over the course of the last century a separate and distinct youth justice system has become 
firmly embedded within the law of England and Wales.
1
  An essential aspect of the system of 
criminal justice for minors is the provision of a range of measures designed to accommodate 
better the particular needs and capabilities of children, part of the purpose of which is to 
secure more effective protection of their rights.
2
  Typically in many jurisdictions (including 
England and Wales) differential treatment for juveniles includes a separate and more informal 
(youth) court, a range of sentences distinct from those available to adults (for example, 
intensive fostering or restorative conferences), stricter thresholds for the imposition of a 
custodial sentence or secure remand, and special protections whilst in police custody.
3
  It was 
                                                          

 Newcastle Law School, Newcastle University. 
1
 The legislative origins of the English youth justice system date back to the creation of the juvenile court (now 
youth court) in the Children Act 1908. However, even before 1908 separate means of dealing with children in 
conflict with the law had already emerged.  On the history of youth justice in England and Wales see A. Morris, 
H. Giller, E. Szwed, and H. Geach, Justice for Children (The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1980) and W. Cavenagh, 
Juvenile Courts, the Child and the Law (Penguin Books, 1967). 
2
 These relate to criminal justice processes: much larger issues of justice and rights arise in relation to holding 
children criminally responsible against the same standards as adults. 
3
 For an overview of children’s rights in youth justice see A. Bainham and S. Gilmore, Children: The Modern 
Law (Jordans, 4
th
 edn, 2013), chap 15.  There are some notable exceptions to the differential treatment approach, 
2 
 
this last issue that was the subject of the judicial review in R (on the application of HC) v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department,
4
 where the exclusion of 17 year olds from the 
protection afforded by the conferral of special rights to all other children who are detained, 
questioned and arrested by the police was challenged by HC.  
Age boundaries in the youth justice system are a well-trodden academic territory, but 
it is ordinarily the threshold for criminal responsibility, the lower age boundary, that is the 
focus of critique.
5
  This commentary explores instead when the protections afforded to young 
people in the criminal justice system end.  It examines the nature of the protections afforded 
to children whilst detained by the police, and what the decision in HC suggests about the way 
the law perceives children and their rights in youth justice.  The commentary begins with a 
brief overview of the rights that are available to children in police custody and the recent 
changes to the upper age boundary in other parts the of youth justice system, before turning 
to the facts and the legal issues in HC.  The discussion then focuses on three issues 
concerning best interests and rights, drawing on available empirical evidence to explore the 
presumptions, outcome and reasoning in the decision.   
 
1. CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND 
1.1 The necessity of special protections for children in police custody 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
for example, children can be tried as adults in the Crown Court if they are charged with a very serious offence 
(one that would warrant a custodial sentence longer than two years) or are co-defendants with an adult.  
However, even here special measures are meant to be in place to secure the child’s effective participation as 
required by Article 6, and to protect her welfare.  See V v United Kingdom (1999) 30 EHRR 121, the subsequent 
Practice Direction [Criminal] [2007] 1 WLR 1790 and the consolidated criminal procedure rules, especially 
Rule III.30.3 
4
 [2013] EWHC 982 (Admin).  Hereafter ‘HC’.  
5
 See most recently, ‘Special Issue: The Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility: Clinical, 
Criminological/Sociological, Developmental and Legal Perspectives’, (2013) 13(2) Youth Justice: An 
International Journal and T. Bateman, ‘Criminalising Children for No Good Purpose: The 
Age of Criminal Responsibility in England and Wales’ (National Association for Youth Justice 
Campaign Paper, 2012). 
3 
 
Criminal punishment constitutes one of the most coercive powers of the state, and a range of 
rights therefore exists to ensure that such power is exercised legally, proportionally and only 
against those guilty of a legal wrongdoing.  Rights have particular importance during police 
detention where the risk of coercion, false confession, and maltreatment are at their greatest.
6
  
A range of rights - legal and constitutional, many of which are contained in the Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and its accompanying Code C - therefore exist to redress the 
power imbalance between the police and the individual suspected of committing a criminal 
offence.  These rights include (inter alia) the right to legal advice, to inform another person of 
his/her arrest and whereabouts, to have interviews tape-recorded, and to be released if 
charges are not brought within a certain time period.  
The need for a robust set of pre-trial rights is even more important in the case of 
children, given their age, life experience, and developmental (im)maturity.
7
  Children are 
‘potentially the most vulnerable of the vulnerable, and the least able to represent their own 
best interests, control their behaviour and communicate their needs.’8  This has a dual impact 
on their experiences at the police station.  First, being arrested can be a ‘frightening and 
confusing experience’9 for children, and the associated processes such as strip searching, 
overnight detention in police cells, and the giving of intimate samples can be especially 
                                                          
6
 As highlighted by the miscarriages of justice (including the Guildford Four, the Birmingham Six and the 
Cardiff Three) that subsequently led to the 1981 Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure (The Philips 
Commission) and the introduction of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.   
7
 See McGowan (Procurator Fiscal, Edinburgh) v B [2011] UKSC 54, [2011] 1 WLR 3121 at para [68] and 
Lord Justice Moses in HC at para [58]. The power imbalance is very much felt by children – see the results 
reported in N. Hazel, A. Hagell and L. Brazier, Young Offenders' Perceptions of their Experiences in the 
Criminal Justice System: End of Award Report to the ESRC (Policy Research Bureau, 2009). 
8
 HM Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC), HM Inspectorate of Probation, HM Inspectorate of Prisons, the 
Care Quality Commission, Healthcare Inspectorate Wales and the Care and Social Services Inspectorate Wales, 
Who’s Looking out for the Children: A Joint Inspection of Appropriate Adult Provision and Children in 
Detention after Charge (ISBN: 978-1-84986-617-9, 2011) 
(http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/inspectorate-reports/hmipris/thematic-reports-and-research-
publications/whos-looking-after-children.pdf, last visited December 17
th
 2013). 
9
 D. Hart, Children in Police Detention (National Association of Youth Justice Briefing, undated) 
(http://thenayj.org.uk/wp-content/files_mf/briefingchildreninpolicedetention.pdf, last visited 17
th
 December 
2013). 
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intimidating and distressing.
10
  There is a clear risk that the child’s emotional and physical 
wellbeing – her welfare - will be detrimentally affected.  Secondly, children are less able to 
enjoy the rights qua suspect: rights that facilitate effective participation and protect against 
wrongful conviction.  Empirical research from both the USA and England and Wales has 
shown that amongst juveniles there is a low level of understanding of their ‘due process’ 
rights.
11
  In England and Wales, Hazel et al reported in 2009 that young people lacked clarity 
in understanding their rights in the police station, and supervising officers also reported this 
to be the case.
12
  This is especially problematic in terms of the right to legal advice.  Young 
suspects are less likely than adults to be told that they are entitled to legal advice, and are less 
likely to request that advice.
13
  In part, this is because children do not always recognise the 
importance of receiving legal advice and may misunderstand the role of the duty solicitor, 
believing – as HC did - that she or he is a ‘police lawyer’ and therefore not independent.14  
The absence of a lawyer compounds the difficulties children face in police questioning, 
which is experienced by them as intimidating and confusing,
15
 and Hine cites research that 
suggests that young people ‘learn that it is easiest to go along with the adult view than to 
resist’;16 a finding supported by Hazel et al.17  Combined with the pressure of ‘societal 
expectation of youthful obedience to authority’,18 it is apparent that children are more 
                                                          
10
 See for example, The Howard League for Penal Reform, The Overnight Detention of Children in Police 
Custody 2010-11 (2011).  
11
 In the US context see research cited in B. Feld, ‘Juveniles' Waiver of Legal Rights: Confessions, Miranda, 
and the Right to Counsel’ in T. Grisso and R. Schwatz, (eds) Youth on Trial: A Developmental Perspective on 
Junvenile Justice (Chicago University Press, 2000) at p 114.  
12
 Hazel et al, above n 7.  
13
 F. Brookman and H. Pierpoint, ‘Access to Legal Advice for Young Suspects and Remand Prisoners’ 42 
(2003) The Howard Journal of Criminal Justice 452 at p 459; V. Kemp, P. Pascoe, and N. Balmer, ‘Children, 
Young People and Requests for Police Station Advice: 25 Years on from PACE’ (2011) 11 The Howard 
Journal of Criminal Justice 28; and L. Skinns, ‘The Right to Legal Advice in the Police Station: Past, Present 
and Future’ [2011] Criminal Law Review 19.  
14
 As in HC, see para [7].  Skinns (ibid) also suggests this is because the charges are less serious.   
15
 Hazel et al, above n 7. 
16
 J. Hine, ‘Young People's Perspectives on Final Warnings’ (2007) Web Journal of current Legal Issues. 
17
 Above n 7. 
18
 Feld, above n 11 at p 115.   
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susceptible than adults to making self-incriminatory statements, false confessions,
19
 and to 
admit to behaviour without fully understanding the consequences of doing so.
20
 
1.2. Protections for detained children in English law 
In English law, there are three principal ways in which these factors are taken into account 
during police detention, and which differentiate the rights available to adults and the rights 
available to children.  First, under section 34(2) of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933, 
the child has a right to have the person who is responsible for his welfare to be notified of his 
arrest,
21
 and told why he has been arrested and where he is being held.
22
  This right is 
replicated in PACE Code of Practice C,
23
 and goes beyond the rights of all suspects not to be 
held incommunicado
24
 which can be restricted in some circumstances.
25
  Secondly, Code C 
also requires that an appropriate adult be provided to all juveniles to provide advice and 
assistance, to facilitate communication, and to ensure that the she is being treated properly 
                                                          
19
 See for example, R v Stratford Youth Court ex parte DPP [2001] EWHC 615 (Admin) that people under 18 
‘may be prone to providing information that is unreliable, misleading or self-incriminating’.  These potential 
problems are more acute since the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 limited the right to silence (on 
the right to silence and legal advice see Murray v United Kingdom (1996) 22 EHRR 29, para [66]), meaning that 
‘potentially disoriented and confused people from the vulnerable groups will be under greater pressure to answer 
questions they may not fully understand’.  B. Littlechild, ‘Reassessing the Role of the "Appropriate Adult”’ 
[1995] Criminal Law Review 540 at p 544. See also D. Dixon, ‘Juvenile Suspects and the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act’ in D. Freestone (ed) Children and the Law: Essays in Honour of Professor H.K Bevan (Hull 
University Press, 1990) at p 116 on the susceptibility of juveniles to false confessions.  This is also recognised 
in Code C though there the tone is slightly different (it says that children are also more ‘prone in certain 
circumstances to provide [emphasis added] information that may be unreliable, misleading or self-
incriminating’- Code C, paragraph 11C). 
20
 For example, that doing so might lead to a final warning (as was) and the negative consequences resulting 
from that.  See for example, R (on the application of R) v Durham Constabulary [2005] UKHL 21, [2005] 1 
WLR 1184. 
21
 I am using the male pronoun for simplicity and because the applicant in the case was male.  
22
 Section 34(9) of the 1933 Act describes this as the child’s right, not the right of the parent or guardian. This is 
in line with Article 40(2)(b) of the UNCRC which requires that a child’s parents are ‘ . . .informed promptly and 
directly of the charges against him or her and, if appropriate, through his or her parents or legal guardians and to 
have legal or other appropriate assistance. . .’ and also the broader principle in Article 9 which requires that 
where a child is separated from her parents as a result of detention, imprisonment, exile etc the state party shall 
on request provide information about whereabouts of the absent member of the family (parent or child) unless 
the provision of information would be detrimental to the wellbeing of the child.   
23
 Home Office, Revised Code of Practice for the Detention, Treatment and Questioning of Persons by Police 
Officers Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (Pace) – Code C at para [3.13] (May 2012 version).  NB there 
is a new version of the Code which takes account of the outcome in this decision. 
24
 See s 56 of PACE and Code C, para [3.1] and para [5], and the discussion below 
25
. Annex B of the Code, and s 56(2) PACE, for example, if it will alert a co-suspect or hamper evidence-
gathering.   
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and fairly.
26
  The appropriate adult must be present throughout the child’s detention, 
including when she is informed of her rights, questioned,
27
 strip searched,
28
 gives samples
29
, 
is charged
30
 or issued with a caution.
31
   As well as assisting the child in understanding the 
criminal justice processes, appropriate adults can also be crucial in ensuring that children 
receive legal advice.
32
  Thirdly, where a child is detained after charge, the custody officer 
must arrange for her to be placed in the care of the local authority, unless for any juvenile it is 
impracticable to do so, or, ‘in the case of a juvenile of at least 12 years old, no secure 
accommodation is available and other accommodation would not be adequate to protect the 
public from serious harm from that juvenile’.33   This duty is contained in both section 38(6) 
of PACE 1984 and Code of Practice C, and although the wording differs in the two 
provisions (PACE refers to moving the child to local authority accommodation and Code C 
refers to the child being in the care of the local authority) in both cases the child is deemed 
‘looked after’ by virtue of the definition in the Children Act 1989.   
Significantly, until the HC decision, all three protections – the parental notification 
duty, the appropriate adult duty, and the local authority accommodation duty – applied only 
to children under the age of 17 by virtue of the attributed meaning to ‘juvenile’ under Code 
C, the interpretation of an ‘arrested juvenile’ in section 37(15) of PACE 1984, and the 
definition of a ‘young person’ in some sections of the Children and Young Persons Act 
                                                          
26
 Para [3.18] and [11.17] of Code C. 
27
 The Code states that when the child is being questioned, the appropriate adult should not only observe the 
proceedings, but should also advise the young person, observe whether the interview is being conducted 
properly and fairly, and facilitate communication with the person being interviewed. See the discussion below. 
28
 Annex A, Code C PACE. 
29
 For example see s 63B PACE 1984 and Code C, para [17.7]. 
30
 Code C, para [16.6].  
31
 Code C, para [11.15] and [10.12].   
32
 Pierpoint noted that in 73 per cent of cases in her survey, the appropriate adult requested legal representation 
for the young suspect.  H. Pierpoint, ‘A Survey of Volunteer Appropriate Adult Services in England and Wales’ 
(2004) 4 Youth Justice: An International Journal 32 at p 39.  
33
 Code C, para [16.7]. 
7 
 
1933.
34
  As such, prior to the legal challenge brought by HC, 17 year olds were excluded 
from the special protections afforded to all other children detained in police custody. 
1. 3. Recent developments in youth justice: reforming age-based anomalies 
That 17 year olds have been excluded from the protections afforded to other children is a 
result of the alterations to the upper age limit of youth justice, which - as with the lower 
threshold of criminal liability for children - has shifted over the past 100 years, partly 
reflecting changing societal constructions of childhood.  During much of the 20
th
 century, 
legislation that provided for special criminal justice measures for minors – such as the 
jurisdiction of the (then) juvenile court - applied to those aged between the minimum age of 
criminal responsibility
35
 and 16 (inclusive).
36
  All other persons, including those aged 17, 
were classed as adults for the purposes of criminal justice.  In 1991, the Criminal Justice Act 
amended most existing youth justice-related legislation so that the definition of a ‘juvenile’ 
and a ‘young person’ included 17 year olds,37 thus securing alignment with the definition of a 
child in the Children Act 1989,
38
 the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC),
39
 
and the Family Law Reform Act 1969.
40
  Subsequent reforms, most significantly those 
                                                          
34
 For most provisions of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933, a young person is one up to the age of 18 
but s 34 was excluded from the effect of the amending legislation in 1991: see Commencement No 3 Order) 
1992 (SI 1992/331).  See below.  
35
 The minimum age of criminal responsibility in England and Wales has been 10 since the Children and Young 
Persons Act 1963 but prior to this it was 8, and before that 7.  
36
 For example, the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 defined ‘children and young persons’ as those aged 
16 and below; and the definition of an ‘arrested juvenile’ under ss 37-39 of the Police and Criminal Evidence 
Act 1984 is a person under 17. 
37
 See s 68 and Sched 8 Criminal Justice Act 1991 (amending s 107(1) Children and Young Persons Act 1933) 
which amended key provisions of the Children and Young Persons Acts 1933, 1963, 1969, Magistrates Act 
1980, Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974, and Prison Act 1952. 
38
 Section 105(1). 
39
 Article 1.  
40
 Section 1 of which had reduced the age of majority from 21to 18.  
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collectively referred to as the ‘new youth justice’,41 further entrenched 18 as the upper age 
boundary of the youth justice system.
42
   
However, until 2012 there were two exceptions to the otherwise consistent age 
demarcation between childhood and adulthood in criminal justice: 17 year olds were treated 
as adults (1) when in police detention (as described above) and (2) for remand purposes.
43
  
These anomalies were partially remedied by the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of 
Offenders Act 2012 (LASPO), which introduced a new system of secure remand for children.  
As well as introducing tighter remand conditions
44
 and attributing looked-after status to 
remanded children,
45
 LASPO extended the remand system for children to all persons up to 
the age of 18.
46
  During the passage of the Act through Parliament, the Government informed 
the House of Lords that it would also keep under review the possibility of extending to 17 
year olds the child-specific protections available to other minors in police detention.
47
  
However, four months later in July 2012 the then Minister for Police and Criminal Justice, 
Nick Herbert, announced by way of a response to a Parliamentary Written Question that, 
having ‘considered the benefits, risks, and costs’ the Government had concluded that at this 
time it was not ‘appropriate’ to amend the law; 17 year olds would continue to be treated as 
                                                          
41
 B. Goldson. The New Youth Justice (Russell House Publishing Ltd, 2000). See in particular the Crime and 
Disorder Act 1998, the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, and the Powers of the Criminal Courts 
(Sentencing) Act 2000.  The ‘new youth justice’ included a new principal aim for the youth justice system 
(prevention of offending), a range of special sentences, a distinct system of diversion, and a range of 
institutional reforms including the establishment of the youth justice board and youth offender teams; all of 
which applied to children up to the age of 18. 
42
 See especially, Crime and Disorder Act 1998, s 117. 
43
 See the criticism by the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child in its 2002 report on the UK: United 
Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the 
Child: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 2002, CRC/C/15 Add 18, at para [57]. 
44
 Sections 98 and 99 LASPO.  
45
 Specifically, s 104 LASPO provides that such children will be ‘treated’ as looked-after. 
46
 Section 91(6).  See further, K. Hollingsworth, ‘Youth Justice Reform in the Big Society’ (2012) 34(2) Journal 
of Social Welfare and Family Law 245 at pp 250ff.  The Bail Act 1976 has also been amended so that the 
definition of a young person now includes 17 year olds except in relation to s 3(7) (requirement that consenting 
parents ensure compliance of the child with the surety) which does not extend to 17 year olds.  
47
 The Government’s assurance was made in response to an amendment tabled by Lord Beecham which would 
have required the Secretary of State to review within three years the use of appropriate adults in the youth 
cautioning process, and whether it should extend to 17 year olds.  The amendment was withdrawn in light of the 
Government’s statement that it would be kept under review.  See Hansard 15 February 2012, Amendment 185A 
moved by Lord Beecham (col 882).   
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adults within PACE.
48
  The announcement meant that the status quo was maintained and it 
was this backtracking by the Coalition Government that prompted the legal challenge in HC. 
 
2. THE FACTS IN HC 
The case centred on the arrest and detention of HC, a 17 year-old boy who had never been in 
trouble with the police before but who, on 19th April 2012, was arrested on suspicion of 
robbery and detained at Battersea Police Station.  HC had requested that his mother be 
informed of his arrest under section 56 PACE,
49
 but his request was denied pursuant to 
section 56(5); that doing so could hinder the recovery of property obtained in the commission 
of the offence.
50
  HC’s mother only became aware of his arrest four and a half hours later 
when his grandmother’s house (where HC lived during the week) was searched.   HC was 
bailed at 4am - 11 and a half hours after arriving at the police station - and bail was 
eventually cancelled and no charges brought when HC’s oyster card record showed that he 
could not have committed the robbery.
51
   
The key issue in the case concerned the obligations owed to 17 year olds under Code 
C of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.
52
  Three claims were made in the 
proceedings; one against the Secretary of State for the Home Department and two against the 
Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis.  The claim against the Home Secretary was that 
her failure to exercise her discretion was irrational under the common law principles of 
                                                          
48
 Nick Herbert MP, answer to written question on 16
th
 July 2012, Hansard Col 549W.  No reference was made 
in the question or the answer to the provisions of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 that also provides 
special protections for children. 
49
 Above, text at nn 22 and 24. 
50
 See HC para [8]. 
51
 An oyster card is an electronic payment card used on public transport throughout London. 
52
 The provisions in the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 and PACE 1984 (the Act itself, not the Codes) 
were not the focus of the challenge; rather it was the discretionary powers of the Home Secretary that were the 
object of concern.  The validity of primary legislation cannot, of course, be questioned by a court, but its 
compatibility with the ECHR could have been considered under ss 3 and 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998. 
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judicial review and it contravened Article 6 and Article 8 of the ECHR (see below).  The 
basis of the challenge to the Commissioner of Police was two-fold.  First, it was argued that 
the failure by the police to contact HC’s parents was a breach of the duty under section 11 of 
the Children Act 2004 to have regard to the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of 
children.  It was further claimed that the police had fallen foul of Article 9(4) UNCRC, a 
provision that requires ‘essential information’ to be given to parents where the state has acted 
in a way that separates them from their child.  The second element of the claim was that the 
Commissioner applied a blanket policy regarding the (non-) provision of appropriate adult 
support to 17 year-olds and that this constituted a fetter of discretion and hence was unlawful.  
However the primary challenge – and that upon which the judgment of Lord Justice Moses 
was based - was against the Home Secretary for failing to exercise her power to amend Code 
C to extend the special protections to 17 year olds.   
In light of the decision on the claim against the Home Secretary (see below), it was 
held by the Court that the claims against the Commissioner of Police did not warrant separate 
consideration and that the Commissioner was not to be blamed for following the letter of 
Code C; it was the Code itself, and the Home Secretary’s failure to amend it, that was the 
principal object of concern.  No relief was therefore granted against the Commissioner for the 
Police, in recognition, perhaps, that the purpose of the challenge was strategic: to secure the 
amendment of PACE.   
 
3. THE LEGAL ISSUES 
The central question in the case was the legality of treating 17 year olds as adults when 
arrested, questioned and detained in police custody, and specifically the exclusion from the 
provisions within PACE Code C. The Home Secretary has the power to amend the PACE 
11 
 
Codes of Practice (with the approval of both House of Parliament) and in HC she accepted 
that she could exercise her discretion to alter the Code in order to bring 17 year olds within 
the definition of juveniles for the purpose of the child-specific protections, even if the 
equivalent statutory provisions did not so extend. However, the Secretary of State did not 
accept that she was legally obliged to make such amendments.   
There were two principal, interlinking strands to the claimant’s argument.53  The first 
centred on establishing that children as a class ought to be treated differently from adults 
when in police detention: that the power imbalance between children and the police, and 
children’s vulnerability and lower levels of capacity, necessitate the additional support 
provided under PACE Code C.  The Court drew extensively on dicta from previous cases 
(including V v United Kingdom
54
, R (on the application of R) v Durham Constabulary
55
, 
Camberwell Green
56
 and McGowan
57
) that have consistently emphasised over the course of 
15 years the need for children to be given extra protection throughout criminal justice 
processes.
58
  For the High Court in HC, these authorities meant that the requirement for 
special treatment for children was beyond doubt.  
The second aspect of the argument – and the crux of the case - was that the Home 
Secretary was wrong to define a child for these purposes as a person under 17 years old. The 
                                                          
53
 These two strands were merged in the judgment.  The claimant’s arguments were supported by evidence 
presented to the court by the parents of two 17 year-old boys who had committed suicide after being arrested, 
and by the Howard League for Penal Reform and the Coram Children’s Centre who both submitted 
interventions. 
54
 Above n 3 (un-adapted proceedings in the Crown court can breach Article 6 ECHR if the child’s ability to 
participate effectively is restricted). 
55
 Above n 20 (consent was not required prior to the issuing of a final warning even though it is required for an 
adult caution). 
56
 R (on the application of D) v Camberwell Green Youth Court [2005] UKHL 4, [2005] 1 WLR 393 (the 
availability of special measures to vulnerable witnesses under the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 
1999, which do not extend to child defendants, does not create an inequality of arms sufficient to breach Article 
6 ECHR). 
57
 Above n 7 (recognition of the special requirements for children regarding legal representation). 
58
 Of course, accepting the principal of differential treatment does not mean the law – legislative or 
jurisprudential – goes far enough in giving effect to the principle: see the critique of the Durham decision for 
example in L. Koffman and G. Dingwall, ‘The Diversion of Young Offenders: A Proportionate Response?’ 
(2007) Web Journal of Current Legal Issues 2 and K. Hollingsworth, ‘Judicial Approaches to Children's Rights 
in Youth Crime’ (2007) 19 Child and Family Law Quarterly 42. 
12 
 
difficulty with defining any age boundary, as pointed out by Lord Justice Moses, is that 
empirically there will be some 17 year olds who are ‘far better able to face detention and 
questioning than those much older’: age provides no definite answer as to capacity, 
vulnerability or power; although it is, of course, one indicator (and one which is particularly 
strong the younger the child is).  Nonetheless, throughout domestic and international law a 
child is defined as a person under the age of 18.  Domestically, most legislation relating to 
youth justice (as explained above), as well as other key children law provisions (including the 
Children Acts 1989 and 2004), treats as a child a person under 18.  Similarly, in the 
international context, Article 1 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child defines a 
child as a person under the age of 18.
59
  A case was therefore made on the grounds of intra – 
and extra – jurisdictional consistency;60 an argument further supported by non-judicial 
domestic opinion including from HM Inspectorates of Prisons and Constabulary, the 
Children’s Commissioner, and the National Appropriate Adult Network.  Undoubtedly, the 
evidence provided to the court in support of (1) giving children special protection in police 
detention, and (2) bringing 17 year olds within the definition of a child, was considerable.   
In response to the claimant’s arguments, and counter to most of the evidence 
presented to the Court, the Home Secretary put forward five reasons for not extending the 
child-specific PACE protections to 17 year olds.  These reasons were mostly founded on two 
assertions: (i) that amendments to PACE were unnecessary because of the existence of other 
rights available more widely to suspected offenders and (ii) the special protections could, in 
most circumstances, be provided to a 17 year old on a discretionary basis in any event.  For 
                                                          
59
 Unless the law grants majority at an earlier age.  The claimant’s argued that the fact that English law confers 
certain responsibilities on the child at earlier ages does not change the fact that 18 is the age of majority and 
hence the protections of the UNCRC should apply to all up to the age of 18.  This must be right or else it would 
negate the purpose of the UNCRC if a state could simply legislate on an ad hoc basis to remove the rights of the 
child in specific contexts by purportedly ‘granting’ majority.  
60
 A term used by Barry Goldson in the context of the minimum age of criminal responsibility: B. Goldson, 
‘Counterblast: “Difficult to Understand or to Defend”: A Reasoned Case for Raising the Age of 
Criminal Responsibility’ (2009) 48 The Howard Journal of Criminal Justice 514. 
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example, it was argued that a 17 year old would ordinarily be able to have the person 
responsible for her welfare informed of her arrest (under section 56 PACE); that there was 
nothing to prevent the police from contacting such a person if they felt the child was 
vulnerable and needed additional support (and nor were the police prohibited from exercising 
their discretion to appoint an appropriate adult);
61
 the provision of an appropriate adult would 
lengthen the time the child was in custody which, though acceptable for very young children 
who ‘clearly need assistance from an appropriate adults’, was not acceptable for an older 
child; and a solicitor was sufficient to protect the child’s interests.  These arguments were 
given short shrift by Lord Justice Moses
62
 for failing to address what he saw as the key point: 
‘the question is whether 17 year old detainees should be afforded greater protection than 
adults’; it is not, he said, ‘answered by merely drawing attention to the safeguards in 
existence for all adults’.63  The Home Secretary failed to address the power imbalance 
between the police and children that arises on account of age, and why therefore, the Code 
should provide for extra protection for 17 year olds just as it does for all other children.  Of 
the five arguments put forward by the Home Secretary only one – the increased financial cost 
                                                          
61
 In some authorities, for example Milton Keynes and Somerset, Derbyshire and Greater Manchester, 17 year 
olds had been (automatically) offered appropriate adult support; others only exercised the discretion if the child 
was deemed to fall within the criteria of mentally disordered or vulnerable and thus entitled to an appropriate 
adult under para [3.15] of Code C (for example, see the comments made by Jacqui Cheer, the acting Chief 
Constable of Cleveland Police on the practice in her Authority, made at a Howard League event on Children and 
Policing on 10
th
 December 2012, Aston University, Birmingham; and also the Metropolitan Police who the 
claimants argued applied a blanket policy not to provide 17 year olds with an appropriate adult).  The claimant 
pointed out that nowhere in PACE or in the accompanying guidance does the Home Secretary make clear that 
the police can do so for someone who is not a juvenile.  Certainly, the extent to which this discretion existed in 
relation also to appropriate adult provision was not exercised by the Metropolitan police nor by many other 
forces. 
62
 See paras [65]ff. 
63
 Para [65]. 
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of appropriate adult support
64
  - was accepted by Lord Justice Moses: though even here, not 
without criticism.
65
 
The court concluded, therefore, that the Secretary of State ‘stands alone in thinking 
there are good reasons for distinguishing between 17 year olds and others’ and had failed to 
provide any reason that was sufficient to rebut the ‘substantial body of domestic opinion as to 
the need not to treat [17 year olds] as adults’66 and explain ‘why a 17 year old should not be 
given greater protection than an adult, in the context of a criminal justice system which, in 
general, adopts the opposite stance’.67  Nonetheless, this was not sufficient to allow the Court 
to reach a conclusion that the decision was irrational under the common law principles of 
judicial review – the first ground of claim brought against the Secretary of State.  As noted 
above, the Criminal Justice Act 1991 amended much of the earlier criminal justice legislation 
so that a juvenile was defined as a person under the age of 18, thus extending to 17 year olds 
many of the child-specific protections previously available only to those aged 16 and under.  
However, the Criminal Justice Act 1991 (Commencement Order No 3 Order) 1992 (SI 
1992/331) left the definition of a young person for the purposes of section 34 of the Children 
and Young Persons Act (and thus the requirement that the person responsible for the child’s 
welfare be informed of her arrest) as a person under 17;
68
 and section 37(15) of the Police 
and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) 1984 similarly provides that an ‘arrested juvenile’ is one 
                                                          
64
 The Secretary of State estimated that the additional cost would be £19.1 million but these estimates were 
disputed by the National Appropriate Adult Network (NAAN) because some services already provide 17 year 
olds with appropriate adult support, and much would be provided by the parent or carer of the child (thus 
resulting in no increased cost) or by the volunteers members of NAAN.   
65
 Not least because of the existence of a Home Office document which said that the costs rely upon ‘a number 
of assumptions that are not capable of rigorous testing, and as such we recommend that you do not present them 
to the Joint Committee on Human Rights’. This prompted the scathing response from Lord Justice Moses that: ‘I 
suppose it renews faith in our democratic institutions that while it was feared that the figures would not stand 
forensic scrutiny of a Parliamentary Committee they can at least be offered to the court’: at para [73]. 
66
 At para [51] and [52], where it was noted that inspections of police custody ‘repeatedly comment that 
appropriate adults should be available to support, within undue delay, juveniles aged 17 in custody’.  See also 
the Joint Inspection, above n 8 at paras [2.13]ff. 
67
 Para [70].  Lord Justice Moses was highly critical of the Home Secretary noting that ‘. . . no one outside of the 
Home Department, be they expert or not, has joined in the Secretary of State’s opinion that ‘there are reasonable 
policy arguments in support of each position’: para [56]. 
68
 An amendment to s 31 of the 1933 Act also proposed in sched 8 to like effect was not brought into force. 
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who ‘appears to be under the age of 17’.  The exclusion of these provisions was not, 
therefore, a matter of mere oversight by Parliament.  As noted in the judgment, 17 year olds 
have continued to be distinguished from other children in post-1991 legislation, including in 
the Crime and Disorder Act 1998,
69
 the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000, the 
Criminal Justice Act 2003 and even more recently in LASPO.
70
  These provisions, said Lord 
Justice Moses, made ‘ . . . good the proposition that Parliament has, in relation to the 
treatment of those detained in police custody from 1933 to the present day, retained the 
distinction between those under 17 who are afforded special protection and those over 16 
who are treated as adults’.71  Thus, Code C of PACE and the definition of a juvenile therein 
was not, in itself, ultra vires the parent legislation (not a claim that was in any event made) 
and nor, therefore, was the court willing to conclude that the Home Secretary had acted 
irrationally; to do so would ‘tend to suggest that the court takes the same view of the 
legislation’. Constitutionally, this would be an unacceptable position for a UK court to take of 
a democratically elected legislature.
72
   
However, HC was successful on the second ground: that his Article 8 right to respect 
for his family and private life was unlawfully restricted.  In reaching this decision Lord 
Justice Moses drew on the Supreme Court decision in ZH (Tanzania) v Secretary of state for 
the Home Department
73
 and held that in determining the application of Article 8, and 
particularly the proportionality balance required by Article 8(2), the court must interpret the 
                                                          
69
 An argument was made by HC that it was possible to read the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 in a way that 
extended appropriate adult support to 17 year olds if the obligation on local authorities to provide youth justice 
services, including ‘the provision of persons to act as appropriate adults to safeguard the interests of children 
and young persons detained or questioned by the police officers’ is read alongside the definition of a ‘children 
and young people’ who, in the Act, are those under 18.   
70
 In relation to youth cautions and youth conditional cautions under s 66A-H and s 3(7) of the Bail Act, 
preserved by sched 11 of LASPO. 
71
 Para [18]. 
72
 The court did not explicitly say it was not irrational however. On the approach of the courts to irrationality 
and elected legislatures in the devolution context, see AXA General Insurance Ltd v HM Advocate [2011] UKSC 
46, [2011] 1 AC 868. 
73
 [2011] UKSC 4; [2011] 2 AC 166  
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rights in line with the UNCRC; thus, the child’s best interests must be a primary 
consideration. Therefore, if HC’s Article 8 right was found to be engaged then, given the 
definition of a child in Article 1 of UNCRC is a person under the age of 18, the best interests 
of 17 year olds becomes a primary consideration in considering how the right applies in the 
context of police detention.  The court held that it ‘is difficult to imagine a more striking case 
where the rights of both child and parent under Article 8 are engaged than when a child is in 
custody on suspicion of committing a serious offence and needs help from someone with 
whom he is familiar and whom he trusts, in redressing the imbalance between the child and 
authority’.74  Once accepted, it became impossible to justify the treatment of a 17 year old as 
an adult because doing so fails to demonstrate that the child’s best interests have been treated 
as a primary consideration.  
Given that HC was successful on Article 8 grounds, the court did not consider it 
necessary to decide on the Article 6 argument.  Nonetheless, it was clear from Lord Justice 
Moses’ obiter dicta comments that compliance with Article 6 requires a youth justice system 
that provides all children with special protection during pre-charge questioning and detention. 
The argument put forward by the Secretary of State - that Article 6 only applies from the 
point at which a person is charged and therefore not during the earlier stages of questioning – 
was not accepted by the Lord Justice Moses. In coming to this conclusion, he drew on Lord 
Bingham’s reasoning in R (on the application of R) v Durham Constabulary.75  Although 
Lord Bingham had expressed some doubt as to whether Article 6 applied prior to charge,
76
 he 
nonetheless emphasised the importance of the right to a fair trial during the preliminary and 
preparatory investigations.  It was this dicta, along with that in the later European Court of 
                                                          
74
 Para [85]. 
75
 Above n 20. 
76
 See below n 93 and surrounding text.   
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Human Rights decision in Panovitz v Cyprus,
77
 that Lord Justice Moses used to dismiss the 
Secretary of State’s argument.  This approach is also supported by the decision in Salduz v 
Turkey that Article 6 becomes necessary at the point when a person is a suspect and is 
interrogated by the police. Although this leaves doubt about whether Article 6 applies outside 
of police custody,
78
 it is consistent with the claim that it applies throughout the pre-charge 
processes within the police station.  Lord Justice Moses went on to point to cases such as V v 
United Kingdom to demonstrate that Article 6 must be adapted for children in order to take 
account of their age, vulnerabilities and capacities.  Therefore, although the Court did not 
decide on Article 6, it seems that a failure to provide all children with special treatment at the 
pre-trial stage could constitute a breach of the fair trial requirements as well as Article 8.   
The Home Secretary decided not to appeal the decision and instead the Home Office 
has revised Codes C and H so that the parental notification and appropriate adult duties apply 
to 17 year olds.  However, and contrary to the spirit of the decision according to some 
children’s rights campaigners,79 the Government has resisted extending the overnight 
detention provisions (the local authority accommodation duty) to 17 year olds, claiming that 
this would require alterations to primary legislation.
80
 
 
4. DISCUSSION 
                                                          
77
 (Application No. 4268/04) 11 December [2008] 27 BHRC 464, at para [67]: ‘the right of an accused minor to 
effective participation in his or her criminal trial requires that he be dealt with due regard to his vulnerability and 
capacities from the first stages of his involvement in a criminal investigation and, in particular, during any 
questioning the police’.  
78
 See Ambrose v Harris [2011] SC 43, [2011] 1 WLR 2435.   
79
 See the letter from the Howard League for Penal Reform to the Government: 
http://d19ylpo4aovc7m.cloudfront.net/fileadmin/howard_league/user/pdf/Consultations/Revised_PACE_Codes_
of_Practice_consultation.pdf (last visited December 20th 2013). 
80
 See revised Code C (October 2013) at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/252903/2013_Code_C.pdf (last 
visited 20th December 2013).  
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The sympathies of the court towards the applicant’s claim were evident from the outset of the 
judgment when Lord Justice Moses noted the irony that HC was prohibited under the Civil 
Procedure Rules
81
 from bringing the legal challenge without the assistance of his mother (or 
that of another adult) and yet was ‘denied the unqualified right to her help when arrested.’82 
The outcome was, therefore, not surprising and once the relevance of the UN Convention was 
established (through the vehicle of the ECHR), with its definition of a child in Article 1, it 
was almost impossible to argue that 17 year olds should be treated as adults.  The decision 
and the reasoning provide robust support for the principle that children in the criminal justice 
system require additional support and that this should extend until 18, the age of majority.  
One particularly interesting aspect of the case was the choice by the court to find for 
HC only on the basis of Article 8 ECHR and not also (or instead) on Article 6 ECHR 
grounds; some of the possible consequences of doing so are discussed here. However, it 
should be noted that throughout the reasoning the values of Article 6 infused the discussion 
of Article 8 (specifically relating to the best interests of children) and of course, there were 
strong obiter comments on Article 6 as well.  What follows should not, therefore, be taken to 
suggest that the Court was not alive to the importance of the child’s Article 6 rights; clearly 
these were of utmost concern.   
 
Prioritising Children’s rights 
Article 8 fulfilled two main purposes in the judgment: the first was to emphasise the role of 
parents
83
 when children are in conflict with the law (see below) and the second was to 
provide the vehicle to elevate the relevance of the child’s best interests.  Lord Justice Moses 
                                                          
81
 CPR 21.1(2)(b) and 22.2(2): see para [5]. 
82
 Para [2]. 
83
 I use ‘parents’ to capture all of those people who are ‘responsible for the child’s welfare’ as per the provisions 
in the Code.   
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emphasised early on in the judgment that ‘the overriding principle governing the treatment of 
17 year olds detainees, if they were regarded as children, would be that their best interests 
would be a primary consideration’.84  Given there is no general statutory duty on the Home 
Secretary to consider the best interests of children in her actions and decision-making,
85
 the 
court relied on jurisprudential developments – most notably the Supreme Court’s decision in 
ZH (Tanzania) – in order to apply Article 3 of the UNCRC (that the best interests of children 
is a primary consideration
86
) to the proportionality balancing test under Article 8 ECHR.  
Thus, Article 8 provided the legal mechanism for the court to emphasise the child’s status 
qua child (her best interests and her identity and relationship vis-à-vis her parents/family), 
rather than as suspect (her fair trial rights and her identity and relationship vis-à-vis the state).   
This has not been the approach taken in other, earlier, leading cases concerning the 
rights of children in criminal justice processes.  In V v United Kingdom for example, decided 
by the European Court of Human Rights in 1999, the child’s status as offender was 
prominent, and the child’s welfare was relevant to the extent that it impacted upon the child’s 
ability to participate effectively in her trial, but was not a primary concern of the Court per 
se.
87
  The difference can be seen in how the respective Courts relied on different provisions 
of the UN Convention.  In V, the European Court of Human Rights primarily used Article 40 
UNCRC (the rights which specifically protect the child who is suspected or accused of 
infringing the law) to interpret Article 6 ECHR and made little reference to Article 3 
UNCRC, the best interests provision.  In contrast, in HC, the High Court relied on Articles 3, 
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 Para [30]. 
85
 Neither s 11 of the Children Act 2004 (which places a duty on various public authorities to have regard to the 
need to safeguard and promote the welfare of children in the exercise of their duties) nor section 44(1) of the 
Children & Young Persons Act 1933 (which requires courts to have regard to the child’s welfare) apply to the 
Home Secretary.  The similar obligation in section 55 of the Borders and Citizenship Act 2009 does extend to 
the Secretary of State but only in relation to immigration, asylum or nationality.  
86
 See also, in the criminal justice context Rule 5 of the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of 
Juvenile Justice (the Beijing Rules). 
87
 Above n 3. 
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5 and 9 UNCRC
88
 to establish the centrality of the parental role, and where Article 40 was 
cited it was principally in relation to Article 40(2)(b); the provision that requires that parents 
be told of their child’s arrest.  Of course, the difference in emphasis between HC and V 
regarding Articles 6 and 8 ECHR and the best interests of the child, could be explained by the 
centrality of Article 6 to the trial process and the ambiguity that sometimes emerges in 
judicial statements regarding its applicability to proceedings that occur pre-charge.
89
  Further, 
being detained and questioned by the police marks the threshold of the criminal law: the 
transition for children from the private sphere to the public sphere of criminal justice.  And at 
least one of the duties in HC – the parental notification duty – has little direct relevance to 
Article 6.  Nonetheless, the overwhelming tone of the reasoning in HC was strongly focused 
on the child qua child, with great emphasis placed on the child-parent relationship.  Although 
this may be a case where the court was choosing to focus on the parents’ rights as well as the 
child, it may also be indicative of a wider shift towards a less punitive, more child-focused 
youth justice system: a shift that is also evident in (some) legislative and policy 
developments.
90
  The criminal justice system is a long way from being compatible with the 
UNCRC but the influence of the Convention is surely being felt in the growing emphasis 
placed on the child qua child as a primary status in youth justice, countering the 
‘adultification’91 of children that has been dominant since the late 1990s. 
Article 8, Article 6 and Appropriate Adults 
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 Article 5 protects the rights and responsibilities of parents towards their children and Article 9 provides that 
parents and child should not be separated except in limited, defined circumstances. 
89
 See below at n 93 and surrounding text. 
90
 See for example, the extension of looked after status to children on remand, a more flexible system of 
diversion and a huge drop in the rates of custodial sentences for the under 18s (see K. Hollingsworth, (2012) 
above n 46).  This should not be overstated though and the proposed reforms to anti-social behaviour for 
example, alter little.  For a critique of the latter, see K. J. Brown, ‘Replacing the ASBO with the injunction to 
prevent nuisance and annoyance: a plea for legislative scrutiny and amendment’ [2013] Criminal Law Review 
623.  
91
 J. Fionda, ‘Youth and Justice’ in J. Fionda (ed) Legal Concepts of Childhood (Hart Publishing, 2001). 
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Relying on Article 8 for the parental notification duty was undoubtedly necessary; it was the 
relationship between the parent and the child, and the more general restriction of the child’s 
right to a private life, which was key to establishing the obligation.  But the same is not true 
of the appropriate adult duty.  At least one way to view the role of the appropriate adult is as 
a mechanism to protect the child’s rights as suspect to help prevent wrongful conviction.  To 
the extent that Article 6 includes the right to an appropriate adult, it too should be interpreted 
in line with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child so that it extends to all children.
92
  
Using Article 6 as the primary mechanism to do this could, therefore, have achieved the same 
outcome.     
That the case was not so decided may be indicative of the uncertain status of Article 6 
in the pre-charge context.
93
  It may also represent reluctance on the part of the Court to 
specify the exact content of Article 6 for children being questioned and detained by the 
Police.  Although the judgment was replete with explanations of what was in the child’s best 
interests when detained by the police, including parental notification and appropriate adult 
support to mitigate vulnerability, it was a procedural argument (that the best interests of 
children must demonstrably have been treated as a primary consideration) rather than the 
substance (what is in the best interest of children) that formed the basis of the reasoning.
94
  
The Court thus used the concept of best interests primarily as a marker for differential 
treatment of children and adults in the criminal justice system rather than as the basis for 
specific protections.   
The Court’s reliance on Article 8 and the best interests requirement, rather than 
Article 6, means that future compatibility with the decision requires only that children up to 
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 In particular, Articles 3, 12 and 40.  See for example, the concurring opinion of Mr N Bratza in V v United 
Kingdom above n 3 at p 37. 
93
 See above, n 20 at para [11] and the discussion in HC at para [91]. Nb Lord Bingham’s comments on the 
doubtful application of Article 6 pre-charge were obiter only. 
94
 See for example, para [97]. 
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the age of 18 be treated differently from adults; this would be sufficient to demonstrate that 
their best interests have been accounted for.  The way is therefore open for the Government 
to differentiate between the support that older and younger children receive, provided even 
older children are treated differently from adults.
95
 This means that the rights currently 
afforded to older children to mitigate their lack of power, capacity and increased vulnerability 
in the criminal processes, could be diminished and, provided there was still a difference with 
adults, it would not necessarily fall foul – strictly speaking – with the letter (if not the spirit) 
of this judgment.  Had the Court focused its reasoning on the demands of Article 6 then the 
content of the rights would have to be more clearly articulated and any attempt – in secondary 
or primary legislation – to diminish those rights would risk being struck down or being the 
subject of a declaration of compatibility – at least whilst the Human Rights Act remains on 
the statute books.
96
 
 Parents as Appropriate Adults 
One of the few shortcomings with the decision was the presumption made by the Court that 
parents are best placed to fulfil the role of appropriate adult.
97
   Whether the decision to use 
Article 8 shaped the Court’s description of the role of appropriate adult, or whether the 
Court’s view of the role of the appropriate adult determined the focus on Article 8 is unclear.  
Regardless, some caution should be exercised before basing the requirement for an 
appropriate adult on the presumption that it is parents who should fulfil the role.  
In Code C of PACE, three different categories of persons are authorised to act as an 
appropriate adult for juveniles: (a) the parent or guardian of the suspected child, (b) a social 
worker, or (c) failing these, a person aged 18 or over who is not a police officer or employed 
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 This possibility was explicitly left open by Lord Justice Moses, at Para [97]. 
96
 If the Conservative party is elected as a majority Government in 2015 they have pledged to repeal the HRA.  
See http://www.theguardian.com/law/2013/sep/30/conservitives-scrap-human-rights-act (last accessed 20th 
December 2013). 
97
 See para [69]; also, for example, see paras [63] and [94]. 
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by the police.
98
  Littlechild has suggested that the ordering in the Code is preferential and was 
derived from the prioritisation of the parent as appropriate adult in the 1981 Royal 
Commission for Criminal Procedure Report.
99
  Furthermore, at the time he was writing – 
1998 - this also reflected police practice.  More recently, the YJB also stated that the 
parent/carer is the preferred choice for appropriate adult, and only if the parent is unavailable 
should the YOT provide an alternative.
100
  In contrast, in 2008, the Government’s review of 
PACE recommended the complete professionalization of the service and that parents and 
guardians should no longer be able to act in that capacity.
101
   There are a number of reasons 
why the view of the 2008 Labour Government is to be preferred over that of the Court in HC. 
First, not all children have parents who are able or willing to act as an appropriate 
adult and there is some evidence that the use of parents as appropriate adults has declined 
over the last 15 years since the establishment of a co-ordinated volunteer appropriate adult 
service
102
 and the inclusion in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 of a duty on local authorities 
to ensure the provision of persons to act as appropriate adults.
103
  In Bucke and Brown’s 1997 
study, parents acted as appropriate adult in 59 per cent of cases, other relatives in 8 per cent 
of cases, social workers in 23 per cent of cases, with ‘others’ in 5 per cent, a member of the 
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 Section 63B(5A)(10).  Solicitors who are present at the police station qua solicitor are also specifically 
prohibited from acting as an appropriate adult Code C para 1F. See R. G. Parry, ‘Protecting the Juvenile 
Suspect: What Exactly Is the Appropriate Adult Supposed to Do?’ (2006) 18 Child and Family Law Quarterly 
373 at p 389 and Littlechild, above n 19 at p 541 on the difference between the role of the lawyer and the 
appropriate adult. 
99
 Above n 6 - the second strand of the underpinning rationale for appropriate adults was that it protects parental 
rights to be informed and be present when their child is questioned: see B. Littlechild, ‘Appropriate Adult 
Services’ (1998) Childright 8.  
100
 YJB, National Standards for Youth Justice 2004 (Youth Justice Board, 2004) at paras [2.3] and [2.7].   
101
 See Home Office, PACE Review: Government Proposals in Response to the Review of the Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (2008) at p 5 Available from: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20080901210555/http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/documents/cons-
2008-pace-review/cons-2008-pace-review-pdf?view=Binary (last accessed 20 December 2013), and as 
discussed in H. Pierpoint, ‘Extending and Professionalising the Role of the Appropriate Adult’ (2011) 33 
Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 139. 
102
 The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice (1993) recommended the establishment of local appropriate 
adult panels of volunteers (see H. Pierpoint, ‘How Appropriate Are Volunteers as 'Appropriate Adults' for 
Young Suspects?  The 'Appropriate Adult' System and Human Rights’ (2000) 22 Journal of Social Welfare and 
Family Law 383 at p 385). 
103
 Section 38(4)(a) Crime and Disorder Act 1998.  
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appropriate adult panel in 1 per cent and 4 per cent unknown.
104
  In contrast, in 2004 
Pierpoint found that YOT members were used 54 per cent of the time, and volunteers 23 per 
cent.  Presumably parents or relatives were used in most of the remaining cases.
105
  These 
figures, although not necessarily reflective of national practice, suggest that the presumptions 
underpinning the decision in HC - that parents do act as appropriate adults -may not reflect 
the experiences of many children in police detention.  A disproportionate number of children 
in the criminal justice system are also within the care system, or may be living apart from 
their parents,
106
 or may not enjoy the supportive type of relationship that Lord Justice Moses 
envisages.
107
   Moreover, the child may not want his parents informed, for example, if the 
offence of which he is accused is one which causes him to feel particular shame, or where 
disclosing to the parents alerts them to his involvement in other behaviour, for example 
sexual activity) that they do not know their child is involved in.   
Secondly, it is not only the prevalence or otherwise of parents acting as appropriate 
adults which may cause us to question the desirability of using Article 8 as the basis for 
appropriate adult provision; there is also evidence to suggest that parents are not always best 
placed to fulfil the role.  This depends, of course, on what the proper role of the appropriate 
adult is. Code C states that the role includes the provision of ‘advice and assistance’108 and 
that during interview appropriate adults ‘are not expected to act simply as an observer; and 
the purpose of their presence is to: advise the person being interviewed; observe whether the 
interview is being conducted properly and fairly; facilitate communication with the person 
                                                          
104
 T. Bucke and D. Brown, In Police Custody: Police Powers and Suspects' Rights under the Revised Pace 
Codes of Practice (Home Office Research Study No 174, 1997) at p 6. 
105
 Pierpoint, above n 32 at p 36. Pierpoint’s study was conducted after the introduction of the requirement on 
local authorities to provide appropriate adult services under the CDA.  On the capabilities required of an 
appropriate adult, see J.Williams, ‘The Inappropriate Adult’, (2000) 22 Journal of Social Welfare and Family 
Law 43 at p 51. 
106
 Note 1B in Code C says: ‘If a juvenile’s parent is estranged from the juvenile, they should not be asked to act 
as the appropriate adult if the juvenile expressly and specifically objects to their presence’. 
107
 The only time Moses LJ suggested it may not be in the child’s best interest for the parent to be informed (and 
thus act as appropriate adult) was where the parent was also involved in offending. 
108
 See Code C, 2013,  para [3.18]. 
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being interviewed’.109  But commentators have been critical of the role as set out in the Code, 
arguing that it is ambiguous.
110
  Pierpoint for example, notes that it is unclear whether the 
‘appropriate adult should advise the child on the grounds of welfare and/or legal rights’;111 
‘properly and fairly’ is not defined; and finally, it is uncertain whether the appropriate adult 
should facilitate communication to aid the child’s understanding or as part of a wider crime 
control agenda to assist the police.
112
   The role is thus seen to inconsistently contain 
‘elements of due process, crime control, welfare and crime prevention’.113 
Successive governments have justified the role of appropriate adults as a means to 
secure better evidence and to provide the support to children to ‘explain, face up to and take 
responsibility for their behaviour’.114  If this is a legitimate role for the appropriate adult, then 
parents may well be in the best position to fulfil it, especially given the wider parental 
‘responsibilisation’ duties that have become especially prominent in the youth justice context 
since 1998.
115
  There is some evidence that Lord Justice Moses at least partially supports this 
version of the role of appropriate adult.
116
  However, as evident elsewhere in judgment - and 
supported from a principled and policy perspective
117
 - the appropriate adult should protect 
the child’s interests, not the State’s: the question then is which interests of the child’s?  If it is 
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 Code C, para. [11.17] 
110
 See J. Williams, ‘The Crime and Disorder Act 1998: Conflicting Roles for the Appropriate Adult’, [2000] 
Criminal Law Review 911 and Pierpoint (2004), (2011), above nn 32 and 101 respectively. 
111
 Pierpoint (2004) above n 32. 
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welfare-based interests, parents may be best placed to fulfil the role.
118
  However, if the 
appropriate adult’s role is to help protect the child’s legal rights qua suspect and to shield him 
from the coercive force of the state then parents may be far less suitable.
119
  There are at least 
three reasons for this.  First, empirical research suggests that parents are unlikely to intervene 
in police interviews and instead often take a passive role.
120
  There is a danger that such 
passivity fails adequately to protect the child against (potentially) aggressive, confusing or 
coercive police questioning.  However, this may be a problem common to all appropriate 
adults, including those independently appointed by the local authority.
121
  The difference, 
however, is that appointed appropriate adults can be better trained to more assertively protect 
children’s rights, whereas parents cannot.  Secondly, the young person may view his parent 
as an authority figure, with whom he is unable to confide or seek reassurance; and not the 
supportive figure that Lord Justice Moses envisages. In R v Blake it was held that the 
appropriate adult cannot be a person with whom the young person has no empathy,
122
 and the 
appropriate adult must be able to develop a rapport with the young person, but such a rapport 
does not necessarily exist between a child and his parent.  Furthermore, parents have 
conflicting roles when in the police station which may serve to diminish their ability to 
protect the interests of the child. Evans’ research provides examples of parents ‘siding’ with 
the police
123
 and being less than supportive of their child,
124
 due to the pre-existing 
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relationship with the child and their own emotional reaction to the child’s suspected 
involvement in offending behaviour.   
There are also potential negative consequences for parents who do fulfil the role of 
appropriate adult in a way that better protects the child’s legal rights.  For example, where the 
parent intervenes and insists on legal representation for the child, or advises the child to 
remain silent until a legal advisor is present, research has suggested that the police may 
perceive the parent as ‘uncooperative’ and not acting ‘responsibly’ towards the child.125  
Where this is noted on the police file, it could influence later contact between the YOT and 
the family.  This possible conflict has been heightened by the increased emphasis on parental 
responsibility since 1998, and it is not inconceivable that a YOT officer could use 
information relating to the parent’s demeanour and ‘cooperation’ at the police station to 
inform the recommendation (or otherwise) of a parenting order should the child be charged 
and appear before a court.  Parents are thus placed in a difficult position and are expected to 
act ‘responsibly’ towards their child (i.e. go along with the police) whilst also providing a 
pivotal role in protecting the child’s rights at the police station.126   It is for these reasons that 
a number of commentators have argued that volunteers are to be preferred over both 
parents.
127
   
 Therefore, in contrast to the prevailing view in HC, local authority appointments or 
volunteers rather than parents may be better placed to act as appropriate adults because they 
are more likely to have received specific training, they will be independent of the police, they 
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can provide the child with information about other services, and research shows they are 
more likely to take a child-centred approach (based either on due process or welfare), rather 
than a crime control approach.
128
  The allocation of a volunteer or local authority appointed 
appropriate adult need not exclude the presence of parents during the processes:
129
 Parry 
notes that parents retain a ‘moral obligation’ to be present during questioning even if they do 
not act as an appropriate adult.
130
  Indeed, as noted above, parents are better placed in many 
instances to protect the needs of the child, particularly given the poor information flow 
between YOTs and appropriate adults which mean that non-parent appropriate adults can be 
ill-prepared to fulfil any welfare function that may be expected of them.
131
  Having a parent 
and an appropriate adult present, as suggested by the last Government in 2008,
132
 may be the 
best way to secure the child’s welfare and his criminal justice rights.  
The above is not, therefore, meant to undermine the importance of the parent-child 
relationship or the desirability of parents being present when children are detained and 
questioned by the police, where this is in the child’s best interests.133  But given the 
limitations that face parents in fulfilling some aspects of the appropriate adult role, then the 
two functions (protecting the child’s best interests and protecting her rights to a fair trial) and 
the ECHR rights upon which they are based (Articles 8 and 6 respectively) should be de-
coupled.  That is, a better outcome in HC would have been for the court to clearly articulate 
that the proper basis for appropriate adult support is Article 6 not Article 8.  
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Concluding comments 
The decision in HC has been widely welcomed and has helped to fill a lacuna in the law in 
relation to the protection of 17 year olds in the criminal justice system.  As noted above, the 
Government have revised Code C in order to reflect the outcome in HC.  However, the 
revisions have been subject to considerable criticism from children’s rights organisations for 
making only the minimum changes necessary to secure compliance with the decision.  The 
Government has neither committed to amending the underpinning primary legislation nor 
have they extended the local authority accommodation duty to 17 year olds. The failure to do 
so is unfortunate.
134
 
Nonetheless, the decision has resulted in some important changes in the PACE codes 
of practice and draws a clear bright-line between the rights of all children and the rights of 
adults in criminal justice processes.  However, the reasoning in HC leaves the rights of 
children in the police station attached to their status as child, and to the parent-child 
relationship.  Although this is likely to protect the child’s welfare, it may provide a less 
secure basis for securing the child’s rights as suspect.  It also creates a legal fallacy that is not 
borne out by the empirical evidence in terms of who acts as appropriate adult and who acts 
best as appropriate adult.  The decision could have been strengthened even further with a 
greater focus on Article 6 and precisely what this right requires for children arrested, detained 
and questioned by the Police.  
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